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CORRESPONDENCE 
On the "Auschwitz Lie" 
In the November 1986 issue of the Michigan Law Review, Profes-
sor Eric Stein addressed the then-recent German legislation prohibit-
ing the "Auschwitz lie."1 The "Auschwitz lie" refers to contemporary 
attempts to deny the historical truth of the Holocaust. In an extended 
analysis of the 1985 legislation criminalizing such attempts to deny 
historical fact, Professor Stein revealed the contradictory impulses 
motivating restrictions on free speech. He reported that the most con-
troversial aspect of the legislation was the question whether the 
criminalization of the denial of the Holocaust should be extended to 
cover the denial of other actions, such as the violent expulsion of 
Germans from Soviet-occupied East Germany - in other words, 
whether or not the Holocaust was a unique phenomenon. His exami-
nation of the legislative history and of decisions applying the predeces-
sors of the 1985 Act suggested that the goals of the Act, the rules of 
standing it establishes, the ways in which it defines harm, and the time 
limits for its enforcement presented problematic issues for German 
constitutional scholars, for lawyers and judges, and for the German 
people as well. 
In the time since his article was published, Professor Stein has cor-
responded with several European scholars on the issues raised by the 
1985 legislation. That correspondence, though brief, highlights the 
contentious aspects of Professor Stein's analysis; it suggests that the 
issues of restricting "historical speech," promoting national conscious-
ness, attributing collective guilt, and identifying the role of courts in 
punishing historical lies remain troublesome to German intellectuals. 
Excerpts from Professor Stein's correspondence follow. 
LEITER FROM PROFESSOR HERBERT A. STRAUSS2 
Your comprehensive study of the recent "Twenty-first Law Modi-
fying the Criminal Law" passed by the Bundestag of the German Fed-
eral Republic on June 13, 1985, places the daily detail of the legal 
processes surrounding the treatment of the "Auschwitz lie" in Ger-
1. Stein, History Against Free Speech: The New German Law Against the "Auschwitz" - and 
Other - "Lies," 85 MrcH. L. REv. 277 (1986). 
2. Professor, Department of History (emeritus), City College of New York; Director, Center 
for Research on Antisemitism, Technical University, Berlin, Germany. 
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man courts into a wel~ome perspective. Since I have been appointed 
director of the new "Center for Research on Antisemitism" at the Ber-
lin Technical University in 1982, I have been following the debate sur-
rounding this issue as closely as a layman would in my position. I am 
a historian of modem Germany, and of Jewish Zeitgeschichte [con-
temporary history]. 
Permit me some observations of a nonlegal nature on one or two of 
the issues reported by you on the general situation in Germany. At 
one point, you comment on the absurdity that lawyers and judges still 
apply law handed down from the Nazi period. Here, you point to a 
paradox that seems to me inherent in legal forms of thinking: German 
law commentaries still reproduce decisions seen as precedents that 
were handed down during the Third Reich, including some of the lan-
guage then in use. Given this fact - I have hit on it when I had to 
look up a law book on associations - I seriously question whether a 
law, however well intentioned, is an effective vehicle in dealing with 
the political problems left behind by the criminal regime of the Third 
Reich, and by its survivals or revivals in contemporary political cul-
ture. Although I happen to have come to the conclusion, since work-
ing here, that the German constitution works and is accepted by the 
vast majority of Germans too young to have known the previous re-
gime, I am equally convinced that the genocidal process that led to 
Auschwitz and the unique mass murder of the Jewish people has not 
been adequately integrated into a critical view of German history by 
intellectuals and public opinion alike. Since you completed your piece, 
the world had to witness a heated debate among Gemian historians at 
whose core lay an attempt by the Berlin historian Ernst Nolte to re-
lieve the burden of shame and responsibility felt by many liberal 
Germans about the Holocaust, and to point either to alleged Jewish 
actions - actions by Jews - and to the Soviet liquidation of the ku-
laks or the gulag concentration camps as "logical" or "historical" 
precedents of the Holocaust. It is unclear and precise information is 
lacking about how widely his views have been accepted: prominent 
historians had no difficulties proving his facts wrong, but establish-
ment papers like the "Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung" have sup-
ported what they see as the underlying motive of his stance, to wit the 
perception that German youth can only reacquire a virile national 
consciousness if it sees the Nazi genocide as part of the "civil war" of 
the twentieth century, and thus as part of a universal historical pro-
cess. This view is, of course, diametrically opposed to the positions 
taken by Bundesprasident Richard von Weizsacker in the historic · 
speech before the Bundestag delivered on May 8, 1985, and quoted by 
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you. It would seem to me that even the best oflaws making the "Au-
schwitz lie" offense an Offizialdelikt (subject io compulsory prosecu-
tion by the state attorneys) must, by the very nature oflegal procedure 
and thinking, fail to speak to this most important juncture in German 
political culture. 
LETIER FROM PROFESSOR DR. ERNST NOLTE3 (I) 
Please accept my sincere thanks for your kind letter of June 4, 
1987, and for sending me your article in the Michigan Law Review. 
You have chosen one of the most sensitive themes that exist in pres-
ent-day Germany. The fullness of the examples and cases which you 
have found allows in any case a better-grounded judgment formation 
and makes the motives of the legislature more understandable. But I 
experience a great uneasiness about this law now, as I did before. It 
would be absurd to pass a law threatening punishment of whoever de-
nies the existence of Napoleon; and it would be unbearable to decree 
by law that Napoleon won at Aspern (for one can have a different 
opinion about this, and generally it is assumed that there was a draw). 
The case of the German law reposes somewhere in the middle, but 
isn't it already quite questionable that only a German law is in ques-
tion? The existence of gas chambers has been denied also by certain 
authors in England, France and the United States; does there exist a 
similar extraordinary law in those countries? Can a denial of a histori-
cal fact ever constitute an attack on human dignity of any person or 
any group? Is an Armenian really hurt in his human dignity when a 
Turk questions the existence of a genocide? Where should one draw 
the line between a simple expression of opinion and scientific research 
which obviously may err, and in fact must err, if new ways are to be 
explored? Could it consequently one day become punishable if some-
body brings into connection Auschwitz and the Gulag Archipelago or 
cites the statement by Weizmann from the beginning of September, 
1939? I therefore am inclined to think that the law was "bad," but 
your careful and balanced presentation makes it clear that those who 
consider it "good" are also able to offer weighty reasons. 
My book will not be published in London but rather in Berlin and 
namely by Propylaen-Verlag under the title "The European Civil War, 
1917-1945: National Socialism and Bolshevism." I had great difficul-
ties with the publication that surely were connected with the "dispute 
of the historians." I am enclosing a copy (unfortunately a bad one) of 
3. Faculty of History, Free University, Berlin. This letter and all the letters that follow are 
translated from the German by Professor Stein. 
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an annotated biography which recently appeared in the periodical 
"Liberal." 
LETIER FROM PROFESSOR DR. ERNST NOLTE (II) 
When a scholar answers another scholar's question that lends itself 
to scholarly treatment, he is basically always speaking to the public. A 
difficulty may arise only from the fact that he may not formulate his 
answer in his correspondence with only one colleague as carefully as 
he would in a publication. Nevertheless, rereading my letter of June 
25 I have the impression that I, therein, raised several questions that 
might promote discussion .... 
I write without having answered your kind letter which I found 
waiting for me in the beginning of October upon my return from a 
rather long vacation: This letter gave me a new cause for reflection. 
In short, and using a term I also used in the "Historik.erstreit" '(dis: 
pute of historians), I today am inclined to express my view as follows: 
Every type of attribution of collective guilt, i.e., of accusation 
against a group which is not constituted solely by free agreement of 
individuals should be penalized. The penalty should be the most se-
vere, if a group which experienced extreme suffering through genoci-
dal intentions and measures (like "the Jews") is blamed for these very 
measures or rather for the alleged invention of such measures which, 
according to this thesis, in reality have not taken place ("group 
defamation"). 
No type of constraint of scientific inquiry and research is permissi-
ble, not even if the generally assumed numbers of victims of the "Hol-
ocaust" are drawn into question or even the fact of the intended and 
organized mass extinction by gassing is denied by arguments and find-
ings. In that case, the majority of the "scientific community," insofar 
as it is competent, would have to refute the minority or the outsider 
conclusively through compelling arguments and incontestable factual 
proof. The fact cannot be denied that it would be hard to draw a 
sharp line between the "functionalists" and possible "scientific propa-
gandists." This, however, may not be accepted as an argument for the 
prevention of free research. The "majority opinion" among scientific 
scholars must be formed in a scientific way, and -every intervention of 
the judiciary power has to be rejected. 
The "Historik.erstreit" continues, and since my book has just been 
published, it might even gain new strength. 
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LEITER FROM HELGE GRABITZ4 
I want to thank you most sincerely for your interesting article 
about the "Auschwitz-lie" and for your friendly letter of June 4. 
I was very impressed by your objective, balanced way of presenting 
the problems of Art. 194 of the Criminal Code and the complex ques-
tions connected with it. 
I am of the view that "Auschwitz is unique" and for that reason 
the additional clause "or any other violent and arbitrary dominance" 
should have been eliminated; this addition is ahistorical and makes the 
holocaust, which is "an unparalleled crime," unjustifiably relative. 
What is more, the memory of the killed victims and the witnesses who 
today still live among us are offended by this juxtaposition: A gro-
tesque result in view of the fact that this global insult is placed in the 
Criminal Code provision concerning the insult [defamation] .... 
LETTER FROM PROFESSOR DR. CHRISTIAN MEIER5 
I found your article highly interesting; a lot of what you gathered 
in it was new to me. I also consider your piece very useful. To the 
extent that you take specific positions, I agree with you entirely: espe-
cially at the end where you speak of the "delicate balance" that must 
be found, since on the one hand the memory of the National Socialist 
crimes must be kept alive while on the other hand, the self-conscious-
ness of those who come after must not be made unbearable so as to 
cause a backlash. I am also persuaded by your estimate of a "modest 
contribution" that the courts may offer in this area. 
You would certainly want to know in some detail where I stand on 
the issues raised. I shall articulate my position briefly. I consider the 
transformation of the "insult" into a crime to be prosecuted ex officio 
as necessary, of course only with respect to the victims of the National 
Socialist regime. The extension to other groups, particularly to the 
Germans expelled [from the areas which were given to Poland] was 
obviously an act of juxtaposition, whatever some others may say. One 
should not try a cover-up; every one can see it with open eyes. I see no 
reason for it, certainly not on the merit (no one would think of deny-
ing that terrible event), nor was it necessary (contrary to Vogelsang) 
from the viewpoint of the legal system. In my view, these reasons do 
not apply where the question clearly is one of a practical, urgent assist-
ance to certain groups of victims who should be spared as much as 
possible the burden of instituting a criminal proceeding (and of all that 
4. Senior Prosecuting Attorney. 
5. Universitaet Munchen, Institut fuer Alte Geschichte. 
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is connected with it). Any juxtaposition strikes me as bad above all 
because - apart·from the wretchedness of the attempts to set off the 
suffering of the German victims against the suffering of the Holocaust 
victims - in my judgment the criminal law measures against the "Au-
schwitz lie" can be justified only by the uniqueness of the German 
crimes during the National Socialist period. In principle I cannot ap-
prove of placing any historical fact under the protection of courts. 
And I must admit that I am particularly struck in my heart of hearts 
when the "right" holds it against me that one cannot tell "the truth" 
about Auschwitz without being hailed before a judge. I propose flatly 
to challenge any false allegations about the NS crimes, any attempts to 
deny, diminish or set them off against other crimes. But the reference 
to a judge causes me some embarrassment. I manage, however, to 
overcome that feeling as well, since there are sufficient grounds for the 
pertinent legislation and for the holdings of the Federal Supreme 
Court. All this - and I do not want to raise any doubt about it - is 
necessary. But it makes one feel uncomfortable. 
I - and others - must put up with this uneasiness. It is not 
worth talking about in comparison with the suffering under the cir-
cumstances of those whom these provisions are designed to protect. 
But it also shows - and I want to offer my own personal experience as 
an example - that in principle it is not good for a democratic country 
to protect historical facts by criminal law. This therefore must remain 
an exception. It can find its justification only in the uniqueness of the 
NS crime. 
It means, on the other hand: the safeguarding of the truth about 
the Holocaust must be left to historians, but also to politicians and 
even to the entire society. For the moment, this is not such a great 
problem since the liars, respectively the deniers, are in a minority. But 
it requires great vigilance and a lot of tact. The growing distance in 
time and the ever increasing progression of generations render difficult 
any recollection that should not be reduced to a ritual. What it means 
to be a German after 1945 is hardly clear - even to the majority of 
the Germans. There are evasions everywhere: they are understanda-
ble, one must admit. In my small volume, . . . I have enumerated 
several reasons why we Germans find ourselves in a "disproportion-
ate" position in relation to all others as a result of the continuing 
worldwide remembrance of Auschwitz. It is unavoidable, but on the 
other hand, in the long run it could heavily burden the "delicate bal-
ance" described by you at the end of your piece. Why should children, 
and above all, the children's children of the perpetrators in such a bad 
world, be still made to feel responsible for the evil deeds of their par-
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ents and grandparents - why should they still be treated differently 
from those with whom they would rather like to feel equal? When one 
then hears reproaches from abroad - understandable as they may be 
from that viewpoint - that is not easy to bear. 
Whatever errors were made at Bitburg, and there were many, the 
various conclusions drawn from them by American east coast newspa-
pers were very unjust. (Parenthetically, Bitburg shows how even Fed-
eral Chancellor Kohl at that time entirely misjudged the dimensions of 
the event: After the act of conciliation in Verdun with President Fran-
gois Mitterand, he meant to do the same with Reagan: he obviously 
knew nothing about the difference between the First and Second 
World War. What then should the broad strata of the entire popula-
tion think? By the way, Helmut Kohl has learned his lesson since then 
(see my "40 Jahre nach Auschwitz," p. 69 n.26).) 
In short, to conclude, here lie heavy burdens for the future which 
no court will be able to help alleviate. It will take a great deal of 
courage and tact and spiritual power, on the one hand not only to 
maintain alive the memory but also to take due account of the given 
reality of the worldwide remembrance of Auschwitz (which is also 
deeply anchored in Germany), and on the other hand to avoid injuring 
thereby the self-consciousness of the Germans living today. 
Actually, one ought to be able to draw certain self-confidence from 
the forty years of a successful democracy and the almost thirty years 
of the appreciable public awareness of the full dimension of the crimes. 
For the one and the other are - despite the great deficiencies - with-
out doubt significant positive items in the balance sheet of the Federal 
Republic. But then one sees again returning the signs of the old na-
tionalism, the old bewilderment from the period immediately follow-
ing 1945, the defense mechanisms arising from guilt feelings, 
innumerable repressions, and other factors designed to prevent many 
from facing the truth, the truth about the period from 1933 to 1945 
and, on the positive side, the truth about the work of the Federal Re-
public in maintaining the memory. 
Just now I am preparing a new, thoroughly revised edition of my 
book and the opening address for the session of historians in Bamberg 
in which I must deal with the "historians' dispute" of the last two 
years. Thus these lines should be sufficient for today. 
